Ebook:Analysis Of Deep Attack Operations: Operation Bagration, Belorussia, 22 June - 29 August 1944
Inviato: gio mar 30, 2017 11:06 am
Recensire un libro che costa meno di un caffè e che non è un racconto inventato ma una analisi di un evento storico non è facile.
Per il suo costo è un libro che bisogna assolutamente comprare e leggere tranquillamente in un paio di serate
questo è l'indice dei contenuti
There were 90-100 railroad trains daily to the fronts involved in the operation before the start of it, for a total of approximately 5,000 trains, each of fifty cars average. Of the total, 2,000 trains were used to transport personnel or formations, and 3,000 were employed for supplies. Division stocks were brought up to five units of fire (necessitating 13,500 rail cars), fourteen days' rations, and ten to twenty refills of POL. For the force as a whole, there were brought in 150,000 metric tons of rations, 900,000 metric tons of artillery ammunition, and 1,200,000 metric tons of POL, that is, approximately three-fourths of the total supply effort was taken up by just those three classes of supply. In addition, the operation would need 45,000 metric tons per day of supplies in the advance, or an average of 275 metric tons per day per division. (By contrast, U.S. planners used 600 tons of supplies per day per division.) To care for casualties, there were 294,000 hospital beds, about equal to 18% of the force. (The Soviet planning figure seems to have averaged about 20% of the force for World War II.)
e lo sviluppo dell'operazione stessa. Quest'ultima parte è descritta a livello operativo
"The 3d and 2d Belorussian Fronts commenced their offensives on 23 June 1944, with a massive artillery and air barrage followed by the new penetration tactics. In the 3d Belorussian Front sector, the 39th and 5th Armies obtained the greatest success on this day. They penetrated to a depth of 10-11 kilometers on a 50 kilometers front, and, in 39th Army's sector, the tank and assault gun brigades supporting each assault division passed through and commenced their exploitation for the Dvina River and link-up with 43d Army forces. In 5th Army's sector, conditions were ripe for the early commitment of the Oslikovsky CMG the next day. On the Orsha axis, however, things did not go so well."
e lo rende come tanti altri libri più blasonati che sto leggendo...noioso
la seconda metà del libro è formata da mappe (qualità molto scarsa e poco leggibili) e fotografie di cui alcune interessanti ma la maggior parte non capisco perchè le abbiano inserite, comunque ci sono e si possono guardare.
ps
Leggendo libri sulla seconda guerra mondiale ci sono sempre delle affermazioni, dei ragionamenti dell'autore oppure soltanto una esposizione dei fatti che mi vengono da contestare, in questo caso no, stranamente non ho trovato nulla da ridire: siamo a giugno del 44, i tedeschi avevano concluso abbondantemente la loro cavalcata per il terzo reich e i russi avevano imparato a combattere.
Per il suo costo è un libro che bisogna assolutamente comprare e leggere tranquillamente in un paio di serate
questo è l'indice dei contenuti
La parte scritta si divide tra l'analisi generale dei due paesi coinvolti con le caratteristiche che i due eserciti erano arrivati ad avere nel 1944, gli obiettivi e la preparazione per raggiungerliContents TABLE OF CONTENTS 4 1. Strategic Setting. 6 a. Principal Events. 6 b. Strategic objectives. 7 c. Allocation of Resources/ Forces. 9 2. Operational/ Tactical Situation. 13 a. Opposing Forces. For correlation of forces, see Annex C. 13 b. Military Objectives/ Missions/ Tasks 20 c. Courses of action considered. 21 3. Conduct of Operation. 22 a. Disposition of forces. 22 b. Opening Moves. (See maps at Tab 3 for daily summaries-22 June-13 July 1944,) 24 c. Subsequent Phases. 26 d. Outcome. 29 4. Conclusions. 31 REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 33 BIBLIOGRAPHY 34 ANNEX A — Correlation of Forces (Strategic) — June 1944 37 1. Soviet. 37 2. German. 37 ANNEX B — SOVIET FORCE STRUCTURE (1944) 39 1. SOVIET RIFLE FORCES 39 Rifle Army 39 Rifle Corps 39 Rifle Division 39 2. SOVIET CAVALRY FORCES 40 Cavalry Corps 40 Cavalry Division 40 3. TANK/ MECHANIZED FORCES 40 Mechanized Corps 40 Tank Corps 41 Tank Army 41 ANNEX C — CORRELATION OF FORCES BELORUSSIA JUNE 1944 43 ANNEX D PLANNING SEQUENCE 45 ANNEX E — Major Elements of Front Plans 48 ANNEX F — Dispositions 49 1. Army operations in breaking through enemy tactical zones. 49 2. Tactical densities in Rifle Corps in Operation BAGRATION. 50 3. Introduction of 2d Echelons and Mobile Groups of Armies 51 MAPS 52 WWII - The War in the East (1941-1945) – Illustrations 76 WWII - The War in the East (1941-1945) – Maps 190
There were 90-100 railroad trains daily to the fronts involved in the operation before the start of it, for a total of approximately 5,000 trains, each of fifty cars average. Of the total, 2,000 trains were used to transport personnel or formations, and 3,000 were employed for supplies. Division stocks were brought up to five units of fire (necessitating 13,500 rail cars), fourteen days' rations, and ten to twenty refills of POL. For the force as a whole, there were brought in 150,000 metric tons of rations, 900,000 metric tons of artillery ammunition, and 1,200,000 metric tons of POL, that is, approximately three-fourths of the total supply effort was taken up by just those three classes of supply. In addition, the operation would need 45,000 metric tons per day of supplies in the advance, or an average of 275 metric tons per day per division. (By contrast, U.S. planners used 600 tons of supplies per day per division.) To care for casualties, there were 294,000 hospital beds, about equal to 18% of the force. (The Soviet planning figure seems to have averaged about 20% of the force for World War II.)
e lo sviluppo dell'operazione stessa. Quest'ultima parte è descritta a livello operativo
"The 3d and 2d Belorussian Fronts commenced their offensives on 23 June 1944, with a massive artillery and air barrage followed by the new penetration tactics. In the 3d Belorussian Front sector, the 39th and 5th Armies obtained the greatest success on this day. They penetrated to a depth of 10-11 kilometers on a 50 kilometers front, and, in 39th Army's sector, the tank and assault gun brigades supporting each assault division passed through and commenced their exploitation for the Dvina River and link-up with 43d Army forces. In 5th Army's sector, conditions were ripe for the early commitment of the Oslikovsky CMG the next day. On the Orsha axis, however, things did not go so well."
e lo rende come tanti altri libri più blasonati che sto leggendo...noioso
la seconda metà del libro è formata da mappe (qualità molto scarsa e poco leggibili) e fotografie di cui alcune interessanti ma la maggior parte non capisco perchè le abbiano inserite, comunque ci sono e si possono guardare.
ps
Leggendo libri sulla seconda guerra mondiale ci sono sempre delle affermazioni, dei ragionamenti dell'autore oppure soltanto una esposizione dei fatti che mi vengono da contestare, in questo caso no, stranamente non ho trovato nulla da ridire: siamo a giugno del 44, i tedeschi avevano concluso abbondantemente la loro cavalcata per il terzo reich e i russi avevano imparato a combattere.